ZyXEL Communications P-335WT Manual do Utilizador Página 13

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7.2.3 Step 2: Description & step 3: Control
Disabling discovery and notification will not take away the possibility to download
the description XML file and invoke remote procedure calls via SOAP on a control
point. Since every control point defines for itself where the description file is and
to which URL SOAP requests have to be sent it becomes very awkward, if not
impossible to filter.
7.2.4 Step 4: Eventing
Like the previous steps, it is hard to filter out eventing messages, since each control
point defines for itself where devices should describe. Every device defines for itself
where events should be sent to using the Callback header.
7.2.5 Step 5: Presentation
The presentation step (the administrative webinterface) can’t be used to issue com-
mands automatically and is harmless from a UPnP point of view. There is therefore
no need to block it. Of course, the webinterface itself should be protected as well.
8 Fixing UPnP
This paper has demonstrated that there are problems with UPnP which make it
possible for an attacker to abuse a whole network in various ways in a fairly easy
way. The only solution to fix these problems is a complete redesign of the protocol
with security in mind, for which the standard UPnP “Device Security” profile seems
to be a fairly good basis. How well this would work in a home network, where there
is often an administrator without the necessary technical knowledge, remains to be
seen.
Vendors can improve UPnP security right now by making several fairly straightfor-
ward adaptions to their UPnP implementations, without making any of the intended
uses of UPnP impossible. Some adaptions would be:
Do not allow “privileged ports” (below 1024) to be forwarded via UPnP. No
application that uses UPnP needs privileged ports. If a particular program
does need a privileged port and wants to have it forwarded via UPnP, you
probably do not need that application. Legitimate forwardings of privileged
ports should be done manually, for example via the webinterface.
Check if the InternalMachine parameter really represents an internal ma-
chine. This seems to be done by some vendors, but not all.
Restrict forwarding to the internal machine itself. For broadcast and multicast
addresses use a caching proxy instead (if possible).
Let devices check for firmware updates and enforce these to be installed, to
make sure the latest updates are installed.
Access control could be an effective way to reduce hacks, using the following coun-
termeasures, all slightly different:
Only allow machines that are known by the DHCP server and/or DNS to
make UPnP requests.
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